Rights of a Pretermitted Heir in California
Community Property-A Need for Clarification JUSTN SWEET ' : Attorneys 1 and courts? have generally assumed that a child unintentionally omitted from a parent's will-a pretermitted heir -cannot take post-1923 community property ' under California's pretermitted heir statute That the courts have been unhappy with this conclusion is evidenced by a tendency in these cases to characterize the property as separate,' to find an agreement to hold the property as separate property, 6 or to use res judicata 7 to protect the claim of the pretermitted heir. While such judicial construction may be in the interest of rough justice in individual cases, the danger lies in the possibility that the law may be shaped fortuitously depend-ing on the specific facts and the equities of the first case requiring decision of the point by the California Supreme Court. The court has not yet passed on the question, nor have the courts of the three other community property states whose statutes pose the same problem. In Idaho,' the reported cases contain no relevant decision, while New Mexico's and Nevada's statutes were only recently amended in such a way that the pretermitted heir's rights are placed in question'
A recent California case, Estate of Abate," would have had to decide the rights of the pretermitted heir, but despite a putative marriage' 2 and an alleged ceremony in a World War II aircraft plant, the court found the property in question to be separate property. In this case the testator died fifteen days after the birth of his illegitimate son. The estate apparently was left by will to a woman named Pearl with whom the testator had lived for ten of the eleven years prior to his death, but the will did not mention the child.' The court resolved the legitimation issue in favor of the child,.' but Pearl claimed that the property was community or 8. In addition to California, seven other states have the community property system in one form or another. With respect to intestate succession of community property, the statutes of Arizona, Texas and Washington provide that half the community property goes to the descendants of the decedent, and, if none, all of it goes to the surviving spouse.
Asuz. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 14-203 (1956) ; Tzx. PROB. CODE § 45 (1956) ; WAsH. Rv. CODE § 11.04.050 (1956) . These statutes are similar to the situation existing in California prior to the 1923 change of § 201 of the Probate Code and no question arises as to the pretermitted heir's right to community property. See text following note 21. Louisiana, which uses the continental forced heir and the legitime, deals with intestate succession of community property by giving the property to the descendants, and, if none, to the parents and the surviving spouse. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 915 (1952) . The statutes of Idaho, New Mexico, and Nevada, where the problem arises in the same form as in California, are discussed in notes 9 and 10 infra.
9. Idaho's statute is similar to that of Cailfornia and was enacted in 1911. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-113 (1948 14. Pearl claimed that the child was illegitimate and that her consent was needed to legitimate him. The child through his guardian ad litem asserted that Pearl was not the lawful wife of the testator and that the property was separate, claiming the entire estate as his intestate share as a legitimated pretermitted heir. Section 230 of the California Civil Code provides that a father may legitimate his child by making a public acknowledgment of paternity, receiving it into his home with the consent of his wife, and treating the child as legitimate.
at least quasi-community. 5 Despite the "marriage" and the presumptions in favor of community property,' the court found the property to be separate and with Solomon-like wisdom, the trial judge held that the estate should be divided equally between them; the child thus received the same share to which it would have been entitled had the testator died intestate survived by a spouse and a child. 7 Presumably, the rationale of the pretermitted heir statute is to give effect to the probable intention of providing for an heir whom the testator has inadvertently omitted from the will. 8 In Estate of Abate, had the court found the property to be community, one might suppose that the child would get an intestate share of the husband's half, or one-fourth of the total estate, while Pearl would take three-fourths. This would have been better for Pearl than the one-half which the trial court gave her but less than the entire estate which she claimed. But it is clear that Pearl's purpose in claiming that the property was community was not to get three-fourths but rather the whole estate under the widely accepted interpretation of 15. Under the California law relating to the rights of a putative spouse, the "spouse" may get certain rights she would have gotten had the marriage been valid. Strictly speaking, the property acquired during a putative marriage cannot be community property. 
17.
The trial court found that Pearl was a putative spouse, but made an unusual use of the putative spouse doctrine. Usually that doctrine gives the putative spouse quasicommunity property rights. See note 12 supra. But here it seems that the court used the doctrine to measure the intestate share of the pretermitted child. The intestate share if the testator dies with only one child is the entire estate. CAL. PRoB. Cona § 222. When the trial court awarded only half to the heir, it must have assumed that for the purpose of determining the intestate share the testator died with a surviving spouse and a child. In such a situation, each would receive one-half of the estate. CAL. PRoB. Cona § 221.
Unquestionably, the trend in the cases is to give the putative spouse almost all of the rights of a validly married spouse. In Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App.2d 59, 332 P.2d 773 (2d Dist. 1958) , the court allowed the putative spouse to bring a wrongful death action as "heir" of the deceased spouse. The cases cited in Kunakofi deal with the rights of intestate succession in community property under § 201. Mazenga v. Rosso, 87 Cal. App.2d 790, 197 P.2d 770 (2d Dist. 1948 Torregano, 54 Adv. Cal. 226, 352 P.2d 505, 5 Cal. Rep. 137 (1960) , where he stated: "Since its origin as a state, California has continuously protected both spouse and children (and to some extent, grandchildren) from unintentional omission from a share in the testator's estate ....
Thus the Legislature has indicated a continuing policy of guarding against the omission of lineal descendants by reason of oversight, accident, mistake or unexpected change of condition." Id. at 240, 352 P.2d at 513, 5 Cal. Rep. at 145.
[Vol. 13: Page 8o sections go and 201 of the California Probate Code. Like most similar statutes, section 90 states that the pretermitted heir "succeeds to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate."'" But section 201 states: "Upon the death of either husband or wife, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse; the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and in the absence thereof goes to the surviving spouse ... ."" If sections 90 and 201 are literally interpreted the pretermitted heir will not be entitled to take any portion of community property, since if the husband died intestate all the community property would go to the surviving spouse. The application of this interpretation to Estate of Abate, assuming the property to be community would mean that the pretermitted heir, though presumably omitted from the will by inadvertence, would receive nothing while the putative spouse would receive the entire estate. 2 Section go of the Probate Code states merely that the heir will succeed to an intestate share of the "estate" of the decedent without any reference to whether the estate consists of separate or community property. Certainly the husband's half of the community property which he may dispose of by will is part of his estate. The language "as if he had died intestate" could mean that the legislature believed, in 1923 when section 201 was passed, that this was sufficient to manifest its intention to exclude community property from the pretermitted heir statute without any modification of section 9o. However, in the light of the distortion and inequity which this literal reading of section 2oi may cause, such an interpretation of legislative intent is unconvincing.
19. CAL. PROB. CODE § 90 which in its entirety reads: "When a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child, whether born before or after the making of the will or before or after the death of the testator, and such child or issue are unprovided for by any settlement, and have not had an equal proportion of the testators property bestowed on them by way of advancement, unless it appears from the will that such omission was intentional, such child or such issue succeeds to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate." 20. CAL. PRoB. CDE § 201. 21. Another intriguing aspect of this problem is the absence of its mention in the secondary authorities with the exception of Page, who makes the brief remark that the pretermitted heir statute covers community property. That legislative changes in section 201 were enacted without reference to the effect on the pretermitted heir statute is suggested by history. The crucial language of section 9o has remained unchanged since its original enactment in i85o. But between x85o and 1923, section 201 was modified a number of times. " For a time different results attached depending on whether husband or wife died first and whether there had been an abandonment by the husband. From 1874 to 1923, if the husband died intestate survived by his wife, half of the community property went to his wife while the other half went to his descendents. Thus in a situation similar to Estate of Abate, prior to 1923 the pretermitted heir's share would have been one-half of the community property. The problem which is the focal point of this article could not have arisen under the pre-i923 law. Prior to 1923, if the wife died first all of the community property went to the husband unless a portion had been set apart to her by judicial decree, in which case it was subject to her testamentary disposition, and if not so disposed it went to her descendants or heirs excluding her husband.
In 1923, several drastic changes were made. 2 First, the wife was given the right to dispose of half of the community property by will. Second, if either spouse died intestate all of the community property now passed to the surviving spouse to the exclusion of descendants or heirs. No corresponding change was made in the pretermitted heir statute or in the intestate succession of separate property. California cases until 1923 held that the pretermitted heir had a right to community property. 2 " From the meager evidence available of any legislative intent, there is no indication of an intention to exempt community property from the claims of the pretermitted heir. 2 (1893) which also held that the pretermitted heir statute applied to community property. The latter case is the authority for the statement in PAGE that the statute applies to community property. 1 PAGE, WiLLs 970 (lifetime ed. 1941).
26. There is no evidence that the 1923 changes were part of any study which might have included the consideration of the pretermitted heir rights. The session law dealt only with old § § 1401 and 1402 of the Civil Code, now § § 201 and 202 of the Probate Code. No other changes in the scheme of intestate succession or the rights of omitted heirs were dealt with.
The change which was made in 1923 was rejected in a referendum in 1920. Professor Kidd wrote a detailed article on the proposed change and did not mention the rights of the pretermitted heir. Kidd, The Proposed Community Property Bills, 7 CALIF. L. Rav. 166 (1919). Eleven years after the enactment of the change in 1923 an article was published which stated: "A very apparent and significant element of the 1923 amendment... dealt with other matters concerning wills and minors," but apparently the pretermitted heir was not considered at all. Doubtless, the legislature did not realize the change that would result if the statute were to be literally applied. One would suppose that section 90 would have been changed as well if the legislature had wanted to assure the protection of community property from the claims of the pretermitted heir 8 It is readily apparent that a literal construction of the statutes would have caused a harsh result in Estate of Abate had the court been unable to characterize the property as separate. The heir obviously would not be cared for by Pearl. Moreover, if the pretermitted heir is a child by a prior marriage, giving all of the community property to the surviving spouse can cause hardship." Yet would seem to be the change in the policy of the law in reference to the potential interest of the children in all community property. It would seem that in so far as the community property is concerned the legislature by this amendment intended to entrust the protection of the children of the marriage to the judgment of the The legislature in this session enacted an amendment which stiffened the penal sanction against a parent for failure to support a minor child. Cal. Sess. Laws 1923, ch. 284 § 1. In addition, both houses passed a bill, ultimately vetoed by the Governor, dealing with minors' estates. Both of these measures were recommended by the Judiciary Committees of both houses. Id. SENATE FINAL HISTORY at 111; id. ASSEmBLY FINAL HIsToRY at 135.
With all these measures before the legislature, and especially before the Judiciary Committees, it is unlikely that the legislature thought about the fact that its amendment of § 201 would be derimental to the rights of heirs. This conclusion finds some additional support in the fact that most of the measures were favorable to the interests of minors.
28. See text at note 22 supra. Courts which might have discussed the question of legislative intent have either found the property to be separate or have decided the case without reference to the legislative history. See, e.g there can be distortions in the normal family situation. The literal interpretation can cause wide disparity in the treatment of the named child and the pretermitted heir.
Assuming that in a given case a court does want to give something to the heir, what can it do where the characterization of the property as separate property is not available as an escape? If so desired, the court could award a part of the property to the heir under a different theory. This theory, henceforth called the "liberal" interpretation, starts with the unquestioned premise that the death of one spouse terminates the community. However, at death the property must be classified as community or separate. The main purpose of this classification is to determine what portion is subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent and what portion belongs to the surviving spouse." 0 Once this classification is made, and assuming the property is found to be community, then for the purpose of the pretermitted heir statute the property which the decedent attempts to dispose of by will might be treated as separate.' There is no doubt that the pretermitted heir can take the estate goes to the mother there is little likelihood that she will not provide for her child. But if, as in Estate of Abate, the mother of the child is not a beneficiary of the will, there is a possibility that the child, if unprovided for, will ultimately depend upon the state for support.
30. There are other reasons for classifying property as community or separate at the death of the spouse. Section 202 of the Probate Code makes "community property passing from the control of the husband, either by reason of his death or by virtue of testamentary disposition by the wife" subject to the debts of the husband. Holding that the testator's half at his death testate is separate for the purpose of the pretermitted heir statute would not change this rule.
Also, § 228 of the Probate Code makes the classification control the ultimate devolution of community property under certain circumstances. The statute deals with property which "was community property of the decedent and a previously deceased spouse." Again the test is what the property was at the termination of the community. It would not affect this statute if the death testate were held to require a classification that the property, for the purpose of the pretermitted heir statute, was separate after the termination of the community by the death of one of its members.
31. In Estate of Bruggemeyer, 115 Cal. App. 525, 2 P.2d 534 (4th Dist. 1931), it appears that the counsel for the heir urged something approximating this theory. He contended that the property in question was separate, but he also urged that the heir should take even if the property were community. The court stated: "Contestant [heir] claims that even if said property should appear to the court to be community property, that onehalf thereof has by said testatrix been taken out of the category of community property by the will of said decedent and should be distributed to the contestant under section 1307 of the Civil Code [now § 90 of the Probate Code]." Id. at 533, 2 P.2d at 538. The court did not have to pass on this contention, since it found that the property was the separate property of the surviving spouse. The court was troubled by the fact that the property in question was acquired before the amendment of 1923 which gave the wife testamentary power over one-half of the community property. See note 24 supra.
In this case the court did seem to say that if the property had been community, the child would not have been able to take. Id. at 536, 2 P.2d at 539. Perhaps counsel's argument was rejected. If so the reason for such a rejection might have been based upon the fact that the wife did not have a right to dispose of the property by will under then existing law. Or perhaps the court was simply not convinced of the logic of the contention. In [Vol. 13: Page 8o HeinOnline --13 Stan. L. Rev. 86 1960 Rev. 86 -1961 separate property. The difference in results gained by application of the two theories is readily seen by glancing at a few examples. We will assume that C' (the pretermitted heir) can qualify as such in every example, and that the value of the community property is 120,00o dollars. C"s intestate share is 20,000 dollars-one-third of T's half of the community property. Example i: T dies testate, leaving his half of the community property (CP) to his child (C'). At his death, he is survived by his wife (W) and two children (C' and C'). Example a: T dies testate, leaving his half of the CP to W, and mentioning C' in the will so that C' cannot be a pretermitted heir. At his death, T is survived by W, C' and C'. Example 3: Same as Example a except that C' is not mentioned in the will and could also qualify as a pretermitted heir. Example 4: T dies testate, leaving his half of the CP to W for her life, with remainder in fee to C'. He dies survived by W, C' and C'.
any event, the court did not find the property to be community, and it is only possible to speculate on the reason for the rejection of the argument. It is clear that the literal interpretation can cause wide disparity in the treatment of the named child and the pretermitted heir. The results will vary, of course, depending upon the provisions of the will. But in every case the omitted child, who presumably would have been put in the will if remembered, receives nothing while the named child receives: It is obvious that the children are treated quite differently in Examples i, 4 and 5. Of course, it never was the purpose of the pretermitted heir statute to require equal treatment of all children. Very frequently this does not occur and one of the problems of the statute is that an omitted child may fare much better than a named child. The intestate share is chosen in an attempt to set a fair portion when omission is presumably unintentional and there is no indication of the provision the testator would have made for the heir. But if grossly unequal treatment of children would result, a court may try to employ an approach which will permit the omitted child to take something.
Under the liberal theory, the pretermitted heir takes a fixed 20,000 dollars or one-sixth of the community property in the examples given. The named child receives: The comparative results using the two interpretations show that both children will be treated equally in two out of five examples.
In the other examples, using the literal interpretation results in the omitted child getting nothing while the named child gets between 30,000 dollars and 6o,ooo dollars. On the other hand, when the liberal interpretation is used, the omitted child gets 20,000 dollars while the named child gets between nothing and 40,o00 dollars. Using the examples given-and they are by no means exhaustive-does show that either method can produce inequality" but that the greater disparity results from the literal interpretation. Couple this with the Abate situation or a case in which there is a child by a previous marriage, and it is clear that there are distinct possibilities of unfair treatment of the pretermitted heir and that, if a court in such a case cannot use the expedient of calling the property separate, it is certainly conceivable that the liberal theory would be used. My purpose is not to campaign for freezing the law under a liberal construction. A distortion can result from the use of either interpretation, and in some cases the liberal construction can result in as much inequality as the literal construction. Nor am I dealing with the reform or critique of the pretermitted heir statute in general, since enough has been written on these points. Of course, the problem of the pretermitted heir's right to community property is one which should be resolved by the legislature as part of a general review of section 9o. Preferably, the community property the testator attempts to dispose of by will should be treated as separate property for the purpose of determining the pretermitted heir's share.
extended beyond the facts of the case, and 25 FopanAm L. REv. 752 (1957 The case involved a situation where there were compelling equities for the child. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Peters extensively reviews the history of and prior decisions on the rights of the pretermitted heir. Many of the principles he states are based upon a liberal construction of the statute which favors the pretermitted heir. He says: "Public policy requires that a testator remember his children at the time of making his will. . . . It is the policy of the law that wife and children must be provided for . . . 54 Adv. Cal. at 240, 352 P.2d at 514, 5 Cal. Rep. at 146.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that a month after Torregano a majority, speaking through Justice Peters, refused to decide a similar no contest, disinheritance clause case on the merits. Estate of Stickelbaut, 54 Adv. Cal. 405, 353 P.2d 719, 6 Cal. Rep. 7 (1960) . The District Court of Appeals, following the Van Strien case, had held the broad clause adequate to constitute a mentioning of the heir. 1 Cal. Rep. 471 (1959) . The supreme court did not have to decide the efficacy of the disinheritance clause since the parties had stipulated in the trial court that the respondent qualified as a pretermitted heir. Justices McComb and Schauer concurred on the ground given in the intermediate appellate court's decision.
It is evident that the court is treading carefully in this area. It did not overrule Van Sftnen, yet it would not generally approve these clauses. The Van Strien case was decided five to two, with Justices Shenk, Traynor, Spence, McComb, and Chief Justice Gibson making up the majority; Justices Carter and Schauer dissented. In Torregano, the majority consisted of Justices Gibson, Peters, Traynor, and White. In Stickelbaut, the majority included Justices Gibson, Peters, Traynor, White, and Dooling. Justices Peters, White, and Dooling were not on the court in the Van Strien case while Justices Gibson and Traynor, though voting in the majority in Van Strien, seemed to have veered away from the attitude expressed in that case. In any event, it is not at all certain that the body blow given the pretermitted heir statute in Van Strien would find continued approval among the members of the present court. Along this same line of reasoning, the present court might in the right kind of case hold that the pretermitted heir has rights in community property.
